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Appellant. 
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Priority 4 
JURISDICTION & NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1994), which grants 
jurisdiction for appeals from district courts involving domestic 
relations cases. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
A. Factual Issues 
1. Was there sufficient evidence to support the 
court's finding as to Father's income? 
2. Was there sufficient evidence to support a finding 
that Father had borrowed money from the children's 
trust accounts to invest in marital business? 
B. Discretionary Issues 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
awarding custody of the children to the mother, 
where the mother was more flexible with the 
children and had a better relationship with the 
oldest daughter than the father, and wanted to keep 
all of the children together? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
awarding one-half of the marital home to the wife, 
where the home had been jointly deeded to husband 
and wife as a gift from the husband's parents? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
dividing the marital business without joining the 
husband's parents as parties? 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
requiring the husband to pay half of the total fees 
for the custody evaluator? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Factual Issues 
Findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard. Walton v. Walton, 814 P. 2d 619, 621 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). A party seeking to overturn the trial court's findings of 
fact must marshal the evidence in support of the Findings and 
demonstrate that "despite such evidence, the findings are so 
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous." Id. In short, the 
appellant must take the position of devil's advocate, presenting 
all evidence supporting the trial court's findings, then exposing 
a flaw sufficient to demonstrate the trial court's finding was 
clearly erroneous. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co, 818 P. 2d 
1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). When an appellant has failed to 
marshal the evidence, the reviewing court assumes that the trial 
court's findings of fact are supported by the record. Walton. 814 
P.2d at 621. The Utah Court of Appeals has "shown no reluctance to 
affirm when the appellant fails adequately to marshal the 
evidence." Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & S, 247 
Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
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B. Discretionary Issues 
Custody decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P. 2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985). In 
Woodward, the Utah Supreme Court held that in reviewing child 
custody determinations, "we accord substantial deference to the 
trial court's findings and give it considerable latitude in 
fashioning the appropriate relief. We will not disturb that 
court's actions unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the 
contrary or there has been an abuse of discretion." Id. (citations 
omitted). See also Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993); Sukin v. Sukin. 842 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) . 
Division and awards of marital property are also reviewed 
under the abuse of discretion standard. As established by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277, "[i]n 
making such orders, the trial court is permitted broad latitude, 
and its judgment is not lightly disturbed." The Utah Court of 
Appeals further held: "the trial court has considerable latitude in 
adjusting financial and property interests, and its actions are 
entitled to a presumption of validity." Naranio v. Naranio, 751 
P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted). The 
division of assets will only be disturbed, continued the Naranio 
Court "if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law 
resulting in substantial prejudicial error. . . . " Id. 
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As for the remaining issues, whether or not to join a party 
under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is also 
discretionary and will not be overturned absent an abuse of 
discretion. Landes v. Capital City Bank. 795 P. 2d 1127 (Utah 
1990). And an award of attorney fees or costs (in this case half 
of the custody evaluators' total fees) is likewise discretionary. 
Crockett v. Crockett. 836 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
A court of equity only abuses discretion if there exists "no 
reasonable basis for the decision." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 
860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). Only if the trial judge's ruling is 
"so unreasonable that it can be classified as arbitrary and 
capricious or a clear abuse of discretion" will it be reversed. 
Judge Norman H. Jackson, "Utah Standards of Appellate Review," Vol. 
7. No. 8. Utah Bar J. 9, 19-20 (citing Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 
270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); and Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468, 476 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993)). 
PERTINENT STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(7)(a) (1990) (emphasis added): 
Income may not be imputed to a parent unless 
that parent stipulates to the amount imputed 
or a hearing is held and a finding made that 
the parent is voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed. 
Rule 19(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1987) (emphasis added): 
Persons to be joined if feasible. A person 
who is subject to service of process and whose 
joinder will not deprive the court of juris-
diction over the subject matter of the action 
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shall be joined as a party in the action if 
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be 
accorded among those already parties, or (2) 
he claims an interest relating to the subject 
of the action and is so situated that the 
disposition of the action in his absence may 
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede his 
ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave 
any of the persons already parties subject to 
a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of the claimed interest. 
Rule 19(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1987): 
Determination by court whenever joinder not 
feasible. If a person as described in 
Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a 
party, the court shall determine whether in 
equity and good conscience the action should 
proceed among the parties before it, or should 
be dismisses, the absent person thus regarded 
as indispensable. The factors to be 
considered by the court include: first, to 
what extent a judgment rendered in the per-
son's absence might be prejudicial to him or 
those already parties; second, the extent to 
which, by protective provisions in the 
judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other 
measure, the prejudice can be lessened or 
avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in 
the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, 
whether the plaintiff will have an adequate 
remedy if the action is dismissed for non-
joinder. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below 
This is a divorce action involving issues of custody and 
property division. The parties to this action, Jerri K. and 
Randall I. Schwartz, were divorced in the first part of a 
bifurcated proceeding on September 14, 1993. (R. 172.) On 
December 20, 1993, trial on the issue of custody and visitation of 
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the couple's four children was held before Judge Anthony Schofield 
of the Fourth District Court for Utah County. (R. 212-19.) The 
disposition of the marital home, business and personal property, as 
well as issues of support, took place in a subsequent proceeding on 
March 1, 1994. The court issued its ruling dated March 30, 1994. 
(R. 316.) 
B. Disposition at Trial Court 
At trial, the plaintiff, Jerri K. Schwartz (Appellee in this 
action) received primary physical custody of the children in a 
joint custody arrangement. She also received the marital home. 
Appellant Randall I. Schwartz received the marital business and 
joint custody of the children. 
C. Relevant Facts 
During their marriage, the couple had four children and 
acquired a home, a business, and various debts. The home was a 
gift to them from Mr. Schwartz's parents, who deeded it jointly to 
both parties over a period of three years. (R. 308-11.) The 
marital business, a feed store, began operations in 1987. (R. 
308.) In order to finance the business, the couple took loans from 
Mr. Schwartz's parents totalling $66,3 3 3.00. In adjusting the 
disposition of the business to the parties, the court took into 
account the amounts owed by the parties,to Mr. Schwartz's parents. 
(R. 306-08.) At one point, the couple borrowed $7,000 from trust 
accounts that had been set up for the children by Mrs. Schwartz's 
family; this money was used to pay bills for the business. The 
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court included these trust account loans as liabilities in its 
valuation of the business. (R. 306.) 
Before ruling on the custody issues, the court appointed a 
custody evaluator and ordered that both parties share equally the 
expenses incurred thereby. (R. 180-81.) The trial court resolved 
the issue of custody by giving joint custody to both parents, Mrs. 
Schwartz having primary physical custody of the children. (R. 
322.) The trial court found that both parties were good parents, 
but given the mother's somewhat more flexible nature and better 
relationship with the older daughter, the court ruled that Mrs. 
Schwartz would be best suited as the primary custodial parent. (R. 
299.) 
The disposition of property was somewhat more complicated. 
The marital home, which had been a gift to both parties deeded to 
them over a period of three years, was given to Mrs. Schwartz; she 
was required to pay Mr. Schwartz a sum representing a half interest 
in the equity of the home. The marital business was given to Mr. 
Schwartz; he was required to pay Mrs. Schwartz a sum representing 
a half interest in the equity of the business. The court evened 
out the various liabilities the parties owed each other by 
adjusting the amount of home equity owed by Mrs. Schwartz to Mr. 
Schwartz. (R. 320-21.) In addition, Mr. Schwartz was required to 
pay back the $7,000 taken from the children's trust funds and used 
in the business. (R. 298.) 
7 
As to the issue of child support, the court found that Mr. 
Schwartz was drawing an income of $1000 monthly from the feed 
business. However, the court imputed income to him of $1,750 
monthly for several reasons: the sum represented his actual income 
from the store; he was able bodied; and he had made even more money 
than that prior to voluntarily terminating his former job to 
operate the feed store full-time. (R. 304.) Because the issues in 
this case are primarily fact-dependent, a more detailed discussion 
of the case will be provided in the body of the argument. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the factual findings and discretion-
ary decisions made by trial court below. First, all factual 
findings must be upheld because all are adequately supported by the 
record; furthermore, since Mr. Schwartz has failed to marshal the 
evidence this Court must assume they are sufficiently supported 
and, consequently, not clearly erroneous. As to factual Issue I, 
the trial court's determination of Father's income was sufficiently 
supported by the record. Imputing income to Father was proper 
since the court made an explicit finding that he was voluntarily 
underemployed. As to Issue II, there was sufficient evidence to 
support the trial court's determination that Father borrowed money 
from the children's trust accounts to invest in the marital 
business. 
Second, the remaining discretionary decisions of the court 
must also be affirmed because each was supported by reasonable 
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bases and were neither arbitrary, capricious, nor an abuse of 
discretion. In deciding Issue III, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in awarding physical custody of the children to 
Mother based on the Father's rigidity, inflexibility and strained 
relationship with his oldest daughter, because Mother had a better 
relationship with this daughter and the court wanted to keep all of 
the children together. The court did not abuse discretion in 
deciding Issue IV when it awarded half of the marital home to the 
Mother after finding that it was marital property; Utah law 
presumes that marital property will be divided equally. Neither 
did the court abuse its discretion in finding it marital property, 
despite the declarations of Husband's parents that the home was for 
Husband's inheritance only. Husband's parents deeded the property 
to both parties as tenants in common and Utah law presumes the 
grantor's intent from the unambiguous reading of the deed. The 
intent to deed to both is further manifest in the favorable gift 
tax consequences the parents received with a joint gift. Finally, 
As to Issue V, the court did not abuse its discretion in requiring 
each of the parties to pay half of the total fees of the court-
appointed custodial evaluator, including fees from in-court 
testimony regarding the evaluation. No finding of xneed' or 
finding of *ability to pay' was needed since these were not costs 
of either party but were court costs. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. There Was Sufficient Evidence To Support The Trial Court's 
Finding Of Father's Income; Because Father Has Failed To 
Marshal The Evidence, The Finding Must Be Taken As True. 
Mr. Schwartz' phrasing of the issue ("Did the trial court 
improperly impute income to defendant?"), is an attempt to 
characterize a factual issue as a question of law. The trial 
court's findings as to Mr. Schwartz' income were findings of fact. 
The trial court's conclusions regarding how much support he must 
pay to the children were inextricably connected to its findings of 
fact and were a direct result of that factual finding. This Court 
recently dealt with a similar situation in Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida 
Cold Storage, 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In that case 
Oneida attempted to characterize two issues as being questions of 
law but this Court found that the trial court's disposition of the 
case "resulted from the trial court's findings of fact and not from 
its application, interpretation or choice of law. Thus despite 
Oneida's characterization, all the issues presented on appeal 
dispute the trial court's findings of fact." Id. at 1052. 
The question to be asked is whether there was sufficient 
evidence to support the trial courts's findings regarding the 
husband's income? The following findings of fact support the trial 
court's determination: 
68. Father is still residing with his 
parents [he does not have to pay rent] . . . . 
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69. Prior to November, 1992, Father 
worked for the LDS Church as a custodian. 
Before his voluntary termination of employment 
with the Church, he was making $10.61 an hour, 
or approximately $1,800.00 per month. 
70. Following termination with the 
Church, Father went to work at the feed store. 
He draws $1,000.00 per month from the 
business, although the accountant reviewing 
the books of the business testified that in 
1993, Father also took a $9,000 draw from the 
business which was not explained or 
contradicted. 
71. Father has not sought other 
employment. He is trying to protect his 
parent's investment. 
72. Father is in good health. 
76. Father has an income of $1,000.00 
per month, but he also took the additional 
$9,000.00 draw in 1993, a total of $21,000.00. 
He thus had an income in 1993 of $1,750.00 per 
month. It is appropriate that this income be 
imputed to him in that amount as he has 
control over the store; its debts, other than 
to parents have been reduced; he is able 
bodied; and while working for the church, he 
made even more. He now works in the store 
primarily to rescue his parents' investment. 
The children suffer from less than they 
deserve if he is able to base his support on 
the monthly draws which he takes from the 
store, rather than on all of the income he 
took from the store last year, an amount more 
nearly like what he earned before working in 
the store. For purposes of calculating child 
support, Father's income is imputed at 
$1,750.00 per month. 
(R. 304-05.) These findings clearly support the trial courts 
conclusions as to father's income. As husband has failed to 
marshal the evidence in favor of these findings nor shown that they 
were nonetheless xclearly erroneous' this court must take them to 
11 
be true. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 618 P.2d 1311, 
1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The findings further meet both the statutory and the common 
law requirements for imputing income. Under Utah Code Annotated 
§78-45-7.5(7)(a): 
Income may not be imputed to a parent unless 
that parent stipulates to the amount imputed 
or a hearing is held and a finding made that 
the parent is voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed. 
In this matter a hearing was held and the court made the finding 
that father "voluntarily terminated" his more lucrative employment 
as custodian of the IA3S Church. (R. 305, Finding 69, 76.) The 
Court further found that he had been making more money at his 
previous job and was voluntarily and purposefully underemployed as 
he tried to protect his parents investments; he was capable of 
making more money; and he has less debt load and no rent to pay. 
Id. Surely these facts meet the common law requirement of Hall v. 
Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)/ that at the time of trial 
husband was voluntarily underemployed. The trial court did not say 
that husband was underemployed xto avoid paying more child 
support', nor does the law require the underemployment to be with 
Wrongful intent' or for Malicious reasons.' To impute income the 
law requires voluntary underemployment and this was explicitly 
found by the court. This Court should thus uphold the trial 
court's findings as to husband's income because they were not 
clearly erroneous. 
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II. There Was Sufficient Evidence To Support A Finding That Father 
Borrowed Money From The Children's Trust Accounts To Invest In 
Marital Business; Because Father Has Failed To Marshal The 
Evidence, The Finding Must Be Taken As True. 
The trial court made the following finding of fact concerning 
the money traced to the children/s trust accounts that was used to 
pay bills for the business. The trial court found: 
63. The parties borrowed $7,000.00 from 
the children's trust accounts which the 
children received from Mother's family. These 
monies were used to pay the bills for the 
business. Mother testified that they intended 
to repay these loans with interest. Father 
testified that he was not aware the money was 
borrowed. 
64. The amount of the loans from the 
children's trust accounts should be included 
in the liabilities of the business. 
(R. 306) (emphasis added) . This is the finding that husband 
disputes, but yet again he has failed to marshal the evidence in 
its favor and then show that despite such evidence the finding was 
clearly erroneous. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 
1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The purpose of this marshaling 
requirement is to promote "efficiency and fairness": efficiency 
because the trial judge is in the best position to weigh the 
evidence and credibility of the witnesses; fairness because the 
appellant has the burden of proving the facts wrong, and neither 
the appellee nor the appellate court should be forced to shoulder 
that burden. Oneida, 872 P.2d at 1053-54. As Mr. Schwartz has 
not marshaled the evidence this Court must find that there was 
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sufficient evidence to support the findings and accept them as 
true. 
As the findings indicate, Mrs. Schwartz testified at trial 
concerning this money taken from the trust fund and used in the 
marital business. Although Mr. Schwartz would like to have seen 
records and cancelled checks, and would stress his lack of 
knowledge of the loan (Appellant's Brief at 18) neither of these 
items would necessarily preclude the trial court's finding. The 
trial judge, evidently weighing the credibility of the witnesses, 
chose to believe Mrs. Schwartz's account. Indeed, it is quite odd 
that the husband did not ask any questions regarding the origin of 
$7,000.00 which suddenly came into his wife's possession. But even 
if he honestly did not know about the money's origin, the court 
found it was traceable to the children's trust funds and that 
husband shared equally in its expenditure. It was not clearly 
erroneous (nor an abuse of discretion should that standard be used) 
to find that he should equally share in its repayment. 
III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Awarding 
Custody Of The Children To The Mother, Where The Mother Was 
More Flexible With The Children And Had A Better Relationship 
With The Oldest Daughter Than The Father, And The Court Wanted 
To Keep All Children Together. 
Husband's brief contains erroneous assertions that the "trial 
court found both parents were good parents, and left the Children 
with the Plaintiff because she was in the home and had been since 
the separation." (Appellant's Brief at 6, citing R. 361, Findings 
48 & 49.) The true context of findings 48 and 49 reveals that the 
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trial court was not concerned with custody at this point, but with 
the division of property, namely the home: 
48. Mother desires to live in the home. 
She has custody of the children and they have 
lived in the home since 1984. It is in the 
best interests of the children and the Mother 
that they be permitted to reside in the home 
during the growing years. 
49. Mother is awarded the home. 
(R. 308.) The actual reasons given for custody can be found at 
Findings 2 through 25. Joint custody was awarded because both 
father and mother are good parents with their children,s best 
interests at heart. However actual physical custody was given to 
mother because, although father was found a good parent, all things 
were not equal. Among the factors tipping the balance in mother's 
favor, the court found that she "has provided the greater portion 
of parental care as between the parents. . . . " (R. 313, Finding 
22.) In addition the court found that "[t]he Father is more rigid 
and somewhat less flexible than Mother." (Id., Finding 20.) But 
the key deciding factor in awarding physical custody to Mrs. 
Schwartz was the fact that the children should remain together, and 
that the oldest daughter has a "strained relationship with Father 
. . . [h]e has not understood her as well and does not relate as 
well with her as does Mother." (R. 314, Findings 11-16.) Since the 
court found it was better to keep the oldest daughter with mother, 
and that all the children should remain together, this dictated the 
court's conclusion that mother should retain physical custody and 
not the fact that she has lived in the home. 
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Thus, contrary to the assertions of Mr. Schwartz, the trial 
court did not find that both parties were "equal" and give custody 
to Mrs. Schwartz only because she was a woman/mother, nor were 
there any implications of this in the court's findings or in the 
trial transcript. Mr. Schwartz further incorrectly states that Dr. 
Stewart, the custody evaluator, concluded that Mrs. Schwartz should 
have the children "because Defendant had not proven her unfit." 
(Appellant's Brief at 8 citing the Record at 189.) The record 
clearly contradicts this charge. At the trial Mr. Schwartz' 
counsel asked Dr Stewart: "So then it is your testimony that given 
all things equal, a mother should always have custody." Dr. 
Stewart responded: "I said no such thing." (Transcript 1/20/94 at 
51.) Dr. Stewart further testified that Mrs. Schwartz had "better 
parenting skills and a better relationship, especially with Keri, 
and better long range potential for caring." (Id. at 48.) She 
also testified that the father's rigidity could be harmful to the 
children, fid, at 35, 20); that he is high on the "lie scale" or 
has the tendency to minimize his faults and deny his psychological 
problems fid, at 29) ; and that he has a very strained relationship 
with his oldest daughter, who would prefer to live with her mother 
fid. 12-13.) 
Husband further insinuates that the court improperly adopted 
the custody evaluator's report and did not make its own decision. 
This statement is wholly unsupported by the record. The court's 
findings are quite extensive and clearly indicate the decisional 
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process used to reach the custodial determination. (R. 311-315 
Findings 1-25.) 
Husband also cites Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 
1980), and Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), 
regarding the interference with custodial visitation and antagonism 
towards the other parent in the presence of the children. Surely 
these cases do indicate important reasons for or against awarding 
custody to one parent or the other. However, the trial court 
found in Finding 24. e. , "Each parent so far has been and is 
capable of encouraging positive relationships between the children 
and the other parent. The Court is impressed with the maturity of 
the parents and the willingness they demonstrated to work 
cooperatively together in the best interests of the children." (R. 
311.) Also Findings 5 through 7 indicate that while the children 
were in the temporary custody of their mother they visited every 
other weekend and had two mid-week visits with their father, and 
that due to this the bond between the children and each of the 
parents was strong. (R. 315.) Furthermore, at trial Dr. Stewart 
testified that of the two parties Mrs. Schwartz is more receptive 
to visitation than is the father. (Trial Transcript 1/20/94 at 
25.J1 
1
 Again at page 8 of Appellant's Brief, counsel for husband has 
misrepresented trial testimony. Mrs. Schwartz testified under 
cross examination that she never cut her husband's picture out of 
family pictures, that she allowed the children to have pictures of 
him in their room, that she merely removed their wedding picture 
and replaced it with her parent's wedding picture. (Tr. 1/20/94 at 
124-25). At the most the citations quoted by husband divulge that 
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Mr. Schwartz has not proven these findings clearly erroneous. 
He has not even attempted to marshal evidence in their favor. 
Rather he has selected portions of the transcript which support his 
desired outcome. Like the claimant in Oneida, Mr. Schwartz "has 
merely presented carefully selected facts and excerpts of trial 
testimony in support of its position. Such . . . is nothing more 
than an attempt to reargue the case before this court—a tactic we 
reject." 872 P.2d 1051 at 1053 (citations omitted). 
The trial court found that despite the qualifications and 
moral integrity of both parents, that all things were not equal: 
because the oldest daughter has a strained relationship with her 
father, and because this child should remain with the other 
children, the mother should have physical custody of all the 
children. This is a perfectly valid basis upon which the trial 
court exercised its discretion. This Court should uphold the trial 
court's custody determination. 
IV. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Awarding One-
half Of The Marital Home To The Wife, Where The Home Had Been 
Jointly Deeded To Husband And Wife As A Gift From The 
Husband's Parents. 
Mrs. Schwartz has called her husband a "jerk," "petty," and when he 
was trying to force an issue that wasn't true she said, "That's not 
true. That's a lie." (Tr. 1/10/04 139). The so-called "assault on 
Defendant" that husbands brief refers to could not meet any 
definition of that term. Wife removed a saddle from husbands' 
horse. This is a far cry from assaulting him. (Tr. 1/20/94 157). 
These selected passages from the trial transcript represent 
husband's effort to reargue this case on appeal and should not be 
tolerated by this court. Oneida, 872 P.2d 1051 at 1053. 
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Husband appeals the trial court's finding that the family home 
was a "marital asset" and thus claims that the trial court abused 
its discretion in awarding wife the home, and husband one-half of 
the equity in the home. Husband's claims should be denied for two 
reasons. First, the property was intended as a joint gift to 
husband and wife. This was a factual finding of the court that 
must be accepted as true since husband has failed to marshal the 
evidence. Second, even if the property were an inheritance for (or 
a gift to) husband alone, the trial court would still maintain 
discretion as to its division. 
A. It Remains An Undisturbed Fact That Husband's Parents 
Intended Joint Gift Of Property. 
The trial court found that the property in question was not a 
gift or inheritance for husband, but rather a joint gift to husband 
and wife. (R. at 309, Finding 39.) While the trial court 
addressed husband's parents' contentions that the gift was for his 
inheritance only, the court did not find such testimony credible. 
(R. at 308-09, Findings 34, 39.) Even if uncontroverted the court 
could choose not to believe the parents' statement of intent. 
Homer v. Smith. 866 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Moreover, 
their statements of intent were controverted by their own later 
statements and their express actions. Husband's parents testified 
at trial that the property was given to both parties as tenants in 
common "to keep the peace" and because they thought the parties 
would be "together forever." (R. 309; Finding, 39.) This 
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statement clearly shows intent for a joint gift. Their actions in 
deeding the property to both husband and wife as 
"tenants in common" is further evidence of their intent. (R. 309, 
Findings 38, 39.) And while, as husband has noted, title is not 
the sole determining factor in a property's characterization 
(Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982)), under Utah law the 
parents7 intent was manifest in the deed. "AIf the contract is in 
writing and the language is not ambiguous, the intention of the 
parties must be determined from the words of the agreement.'" 
Crowther v. Mowler. 876 P.2d 876, 879-80 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(quoting Winegar v. Froerer. 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). That 
the home was intended to be held as "tenants in common" is further 
strengthened by the fact that unless the gift was indeed to both 
parties, the parents would not have received the favorable gift tax 
consequences that they enjoyed. (R. at 309, Finding 39.) 
Intent is a question of fact. Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d 
356, 358 (Utah 1990) (noting that contractual intent is a question 
of fact). The trial court held that the intent of the parents was 
to deliver the property to both husband and wife. (R. 3 09, Finding 
39, 40.) As demonstrated by the previous paragraph, the record 
supports this factual determination. Additionally, because husband 
has not marshaled the evidence in favor of the finding and then 
shown that it was "clearly erroneous" this Court must accept it as 
true that the parties intended the property to be a joint gift and 
not an inheritance. It naturally follows that the property is a 
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marital asset. Based on these findings, the trial court could not 
have abused its discretion in equally dividing the property between 
the parties: "once a court makes a finding that a specific item is 
marital property, the law presumes that it will be shared equally 
between the two parties. ..." Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
B. Even If The Property Were An Inheritance Or Gift To 
Husband Only The Trial Court Would Still Retain 
Discretion To Divide It As Equity Demanded In The 
Circumstances. 
Even if the property were considered an inheritance or gift of 
husband only, husband has not shown that the equal division of such 
was, under the circumstances, an abuse of discretion. Husband 
cites Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988), as holding 
that an inheritance or gift to one spouse made during the marriage 
is not marital property and should be awarded to that spouse only. 
Such is an oversimplification of the holding in that case. In 
Mortensen, the Utah Supreme Court analyzed all of the other Utah 
cases on point, some which have upheld divisions of inherited 
property to the non-inheriting spouse (citing Weaver v. Weaver, 442 
P.2d 928 (Utah 1968); Bushell v. Bushell, 649 P.2d 85 (Utah 1982); 
and Dubois v. Dubois, 504 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1973)) and others in 
which the Court has affirmed awards of inherited property only to 
the inheriting spouse (citing Preston v. Preston. 646 P.2d 705, 706 
(Utah 1982); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987); Newmever v. 
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987); and Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 
468 (Utah 1984)). IcU 305-06. 
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The Mortensen court expressly distinguished those cases in 
which the non-inheriting spouse was given all or a portion of the 
inheritance on the basis of several particular circumstances, one 
of which was when the wife (or non-donee spouse) would not be 
receiving alimony or attorney fees. Id. at 306. In this matter, 
Mrs. Schwartz received possession and half of the equity interest 
in the house, but since she was awarded neither alimony or attorney 
fees she could fit into this Mortensen exception. 
The Court continued stating that the general "rule that 
property acquired by gift or inheritance by one spouse should be 
awarded to that spouse of divorce . . . does not apply when . . . 
the acquiring spouse places title in their joint names in such a 
manner as to evidence an intent to make it marital property." Id. 
at 307 (italics added) (citations omitted). It is an uncontro-
verted fact that title to the Schwartz property was held in their 
joint names. (R. at 309, Findings 38, 39.) In summary then, the 
fact that Mrs. Schwartz was not receiving alimony or attorney fees, 
and the fact that the title was issued in joint tenancy, are two 
reasons the Utah Supreme Court has held will allow a court to award 
inherited or gift property to the non-donee or non-inheriting 
spouse. 
Furthermore, after balancing and summarizing the case law 
supporting both positions the Mortensen Court concluded, 
Significantly, no case has been found where 
this Court has reversed a trial court's 
disposition of gifts or inherited property 
received by one party during the marriage. In 
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almost every case, we have emphasized the wide 
discretion trial courts have in property 
division and have refrained from laying down 
any general rules for the disposition of gifts 
and inherited property. 
Id. at 307. Thus, even if the property could be considered an 
inheritance intended only for husband, the trial court still 
maintained discretion over its division. 
Finally, to distinguish all of the cases which support the 
award of property only to the inheriting or donee spouse, in every 
one of those cases there was no doubt that the property was 
intended to be a gift or inheritance. In Mortensen, stock was 
issued in only the name of the donee. Id. at 305. In Burke, the 
opposing party admitted that the property was an inheritance. 73 3 
P.2d at 134. And in Argyle the husband's mother expressly made the 
gift to the husband and his brother. 668 P. 2d at 469. Because the 
question of intent is a factual matter, and since the court found 
that the property was intended as joint property, this Court must 
uphold the trial court's discretion because it is supported by a 
reasonable basis. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 
(Utah 1993). 
V. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Dividing The 
Marital Business Without Joining The Husband's Parents As 
Parties. 
Husband claims it was an abuse of the trial courts discretion 
not to join his parents as "necessary parties" to the divorce and 
division of marital assets, because they contributed a substantial 
amount of capital to the business the court divided. This 
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contention is without merit. First, the parents were not necessary 
parties. U.R.C.P. Rule 19(a). Second, the trial court has broad 
discretion in determining when a party will be joined and the trial 
court below alleviated any prejudicial effects in fashioning the 
award. U.R.C.P. Rule 19(b); Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 
941 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) aff d sub nom; Landes v. Capital City 
Bank. 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990). 
A. Husband's Parents Were Not Necessary Parties To The 
Divorce And Division Of Marital Assets Under Utah Rule 
Civ. Proc. 19. 
A necessary party "is one whose presence is required for a 
full and fair determination of his rights as well as of the rights 
of the other parties to the suit." Cowen & Co. v. Atlas Stock 
Transfer Co. . 695 P.2d 109, 114 (Utah 1984) (italics added). While 
Mrs. Schwartz concedes that Mr. Schwartz7s parents' testimony was 
important to the determination of various issues at trial, it does 
not follow that they were "required" to be parties. In fact, their 
very presence as witnesses was completely adequate to secure their 
interests in the money they loaned to the marital business. (R. at 
307, Finding 54.) Rule 19(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states in relevant part: 
Persons to be joined if feasible. A person 
who is subject to service of process and whose 
joinder will not deprive the court of juris-
diction over the subject matter of the action 
shall be joined as a party in the action if 
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be 
accorded among those already parties, or (2) 
he claims an interest relating to the subject 
of the action and is so situated that the 
disposition of the action in his absence may 
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(i) as a practical matter impair or impede his 
ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave 
any of the persons already parties subject to 
a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of the claimed interest. 
(italics added). Mr. Schwartz has failed to establish any of 
these elements, and is unable to do so. Furthermore, if Mr. 
Schwartz's position is accepted than any creditor of a marital 
asset would be of necessity made a party to the divorce 
proceedings. Divisions of marital property almost always include 
divisions of both assets and debts—the creditors need not be a 
party in order to assure payment of these debts. 
B. The Trial Court Had Broad Discretion In Joining 
Parties And Alleviated Any Possible Prejudice To Parents 
In Fashioning The Award. 
Once a party has been found a xnecessary party' under Rule 
19(a), the next step is an analysis under Rule 19(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure which explains what a court can do when 
joining a necessary party isn't feasible. In that instance, 
the court shall determine whether in equity 
and good conscience the action should proceed 
among the parties before it, or should be 
dismissed, the absent person thus regarded as 
indispensable. The factors to be considered 
by the court include: first, to what extent a 
judgment rendered in the person's absence 
might be prejudicial to him or those already 
parties; second, the extent to which, by 
protective provisions in the judgment, by the 
shaping of relief, or other measure, the 
prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, 
whether a judgment rendered in the person's 
absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the 
plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the 
action is dismissed for non-joinder. 
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The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the need for a two-part test, 
consisting of an analysis first under 19(a) and next under 19(b). 
Seftel v. Capital Citv Bank. 767 P. 2d 941, 945 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). Obviously since the issue was raised for the first time on 
appeal, the trial court did not make this two-part analysis. 
"However," added the Seftel Court, "a trial courts failure to 
follow the two-step inquiry under Rule 19 is harmless error, if, 
upon a review of the record, there is clear evidence to support the 
trial court's ultimate conclusion." Id. In another context the 
Utah Supreme Court has said, "we may affirm trial court decisions 
on any proper ground (s) . . ." Buehner Block Co. v. UWC 
Associates, 752 P. 2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). The Court has also held 
that where evidence is admitted which might support a decision, but 
no specific finding was made, it can be concluded "that the court 
implicitly" made the necessary finding. Olympus Hills Shopping 
Center, Ltd. v. Landes, 821 P.2d 451, 455 (Utah 1991). 
The record supports the trial court's discretion in not 
joining the husband's parents as xnecessary parties.' Step one of 
the inquiry, an analysis under 19(a), was accomplished in part "A" 
above. Under 19(b), or step-two, the division of the marital 
business (in which grandparents had a financial interest) was not 
prejudicial. The court so shaped the relief as to require both 
parties to share equally in the debt to the grandparents. The 
findings of fact established the following: 
52. To start the business, they [Mr. and 
Mrs. Schwartz] borrowed $20,000 from Father's 
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parents. Before separation they borrowed an 
additional $25,000 from Father's parents. 
53. Neither of these loans were 
evidenced by a promissory note, nor were any 
terms of repayment established for the loans. 
54. Since the separation in 1993, 
parents have loaned an additional $21,333.30 
to Father for the business. For these loans 
to the business, parents are owed $66,3 33.30 
by the parties, plus interest. 
67. Post-separation, Father's parents 
requested that the loans be reduced to written 
documentation and they requested repayment. 
While the Court will not so order, the parties 
do owe the parents the described sum and 
appropriate written evidence should be 
prepared. 
(R. 303-05.) The grandparents' interest in repayment of the 
business loans was adequately protected by the trial court's 
judgment. Hence, even if they could be considered xnecessary 
parties' under 19(a), the trial court would not have abused its 
discretion in refusing join them as parties. 
VI. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Requiring The 
Husband To Pay Half Of The Total Fees Of The Custody 
Evaluator. 
The decision whether or not to award costs or attorney fees in 
the discretion of the trial court. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P. 2d 
818, 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) . The award of either party's costs or 
attorney fees requires a finding of financial need of the payee and 
the financial ability to pay of the payor. Id. In the matter 
below the trial court did not order either party to pay the other's 
costs or fees. The trial court found as follows: 
27 
91. Nor does Mother demonstrate 
significant need. . . . 
92. Father's attorney fees are in the 
sum of $8,020.00, which appears necessarily 
incurred and reasonable in amount. 
93. Mother's attorney fees are in the 
sum of $5,125.00, which appears necessarily 
incurred and reasonable in amount. 
94. Neither party has the capacity to 
pay the other's fees. 
95. The cost of the custody evaluation 
should be borne equally by both parties. To 
the extent not already done, each should pay 
one-half of the evaluation. 
(R. 301.) The Amended Decree of Divorce ordered, "12. The Court 
orders that there is an additional sum of $731.98 due and owing to 
Elizabeth B. Stewart, who performed the custodial evaluation." (R. 
319.) Attorney for Mr. Schwartz objected to this finding, claiming 
that it was not the court's intent for husband to have to pay half 
of the costs of calling the custodial evaluator as a witness. (R. 
326.) Counsel for Mrs. Schwartz responded arguing the following: 
Defendant is objecting to charges made by 
Elizabeth B. Stewart, who charged $731.98 for 
coming to court. Elizabeth B. Stewart was the 
psychologist who was appointed by the Court to 
make an analysis of the plaintiff, the 
defendant and their children and to report to 
the Court, which she did. Both the plaintiff 
and defendant stipulated that Elizabeth B. 
Stewart would be appointed. It was well known 
that she would make a recommendation and it 
was well known that she would be called to 
court to testify. She was not plaintiff's 
witness in the sense that she was retained by 
the plaintiff and paid by the plaintiff, as 
the defendant did in calling his own expert, 
Dr. Gayle Stringham. Rather the court 
appointed Elizabeth B. Stewart, who performed 
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an evaluation. As part of that evaluation, 
she came to court and testified as to her 
findings. It is, therefore, only fair that 
both parties would share in the cost of her 
coming to court and testifying. 
(R. 329.) Accepting this argument (as the court must have done 
because the decree was not modified) the charges from Elizabeth B. 
Stuart were not plaintiff's costs, but were court costs to be 
divided equally between the parties. Because the court was not 
requiring Mr. Schwartz to pay plaintiff's costs, but was rather 
requiring both parties to bear their equal share of the court 
appointed evaluators' total fees, no finding of need or ability to 
pay was necessary. Finally, since the above-quoted paragraph 
demonstrates a reasonable basis upon which that decision was based, 
the court did not abuse its discretion. See supra Crookston. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the factual findings and discretion-
ary decisions made by trial court below. First, all factual 
findings must be upheld because all are adequately supported by the 
record; furthermore, since Mr. Schwartz has failed to marshal the 
evidence this Court must assume the findings are sufficiently 
supported by the record and consequently, not clearly erroneous. 
Second, the remaining discretionary decisions of the court must 
also be affirmed because each was supported by a reasonable basis 
29 
and none were arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion, 
DATED this /7 day of March, 1995. 
DON PETERSEN 
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